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Two recent changes to U.S. federal law threaten the viability of colleges 
and universities. President Trump’s signing of the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act (TCJA) into law at the close of 2017 signified a continued trend of 
decreasing funds previously available to higher education. National 
and state funding cuts are resulting in a cost-value educational crisis in 
the United States, with tuitions increasing, students needing to borrow 
more, and academic programs and faculty lines being cut. In addition, 
college athletic departments assert that the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Murphy v. National College Athletic Ass’n, which 
declared that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(PASPA) unconstitutionally commandeered state legislatures into 
maintaining laws prohibiting sports wagering, could jeopardize the 
integrity of college sports. Only by examining the foundational 
relationships between gambling, taxation, and higher education in the 
United States is it evident that Murphy could actually be the catalyst for 
generating revenue back into colleges and universities rather than the 
apocalyptic threat some have predicted. 
 
Following Murphy, more than thirty states have introduced bills 
legalizing sports gambling. Of those, only two have legislatively 
earmarked a portion of the projected revenue back into higher 
education specifically. States’ de minimis interest in redirecting some 
of this revenue stream to colleges and universities is surprising for two 
reasons. First, public institutions directly finance the very sports that 
are helping to drive the newly legalized sports betting market. In 
addition, there exists a strong historical affiliation between gambling, 
tax revenue, and education in the United States. Consequently, college 
administrators should embrace sports wagering as a means of 
increasing the integrity of college sports and capitalize on this 
opportunity to recoup revenue lost due to the TCJA and states’ 
continued reallocation of funding away from higher education. 
 
The intersection of sports gambling, taxation, and higher education is 
an undertheorized area of law. This Article highlights the historic 
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connections that bind them and proposes a mechanism that public 
institutions and state legislators can adopt to better monitor sports-
related integrity concerns while supplementing college and university 
budgets. This Article is the first to harmonize the relationship between 
education and gambling post-Murphy; the first to introduce various 
state tax frameworks surrounding legalized sports gambling in the 
United States; and the first to introduce a fee model to help redirect 
funding from legalized sports wagering back into higher education. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
College athletic departments claim that two recent changes to federal law 
threaten their viability.1 First, on December 22, 2017, President Donald Trump 
signed into law the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA);2 second, in 2018, the 
Supreme Court of the United States declared that the twenty-six-year-old federal 
prohibition on sports wagering unconstitutionally commandeered state 
legislatures.3 The TCJA was hailed by President Trump and his administration 
as a simpler tax process benefiting the majority of individuals and businesses in 
the country.4 Likewise, Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n was 
celebrated by states seeking new revenue streams to fight against depleted 
coffers.5 Supporting neither decision, however, were college athletic 
departments.6 A major aspect of collegiate funding was poised to suffer a 
significant blow as a result of the TCJA’s tax overhaul.7 In addition, some 
college administrators deemed Murphy a major threat to the integrity of 
competition and the fight to prevent gamblers from manipulating college game 
results.8 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Matt Murschel, New Tax Law Could Prove Costly for College Athletics, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/college-
gridiron-365/os-sp-college-athletics-tax-law-changes-0219-story.html [https://perma 
.cc/9JXL-PCBK]; David Porter & Regina Garcia-Cano, Easier Gambling Has Sports 
Worried About Fighting the Fix, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.ap 
news.com/42b09c7fd1764bf196b13d5c44b2a188 [https://perma.cc/3DTM-247Y]. 
 2 Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, This Is Our House! – The Tax Man Comes to College, 29 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 347, 347 (2019). 
 3 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). While 
the Act struck down the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), referred 
to as a prohibition, it was technically more of a freeze, as states that had offered sports 
wagering in 1992, when the statute was passed, were allowed to continue doing so. See John 
T. Holden, Prohibitive Failure: The Demise of the Ban on Sports Betting, 35 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 329, 330 (2019). 
 4 Mark Mazur, Taxpayers Are Very Confused, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2019), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-confusing-taxpayers/ 
585907/ [https://perma.cc/92H2-9R2E]. 
 5 See John T. Holden, Regulating Sports Wagering, 105 IOWA L. REV. 575, 579 (2020). 
 6 See Chris Smith, New Tax Law Could Cost Top College Athletic Departments 
Millions, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2017/12/ 
22/gop-tax-law-could-cost-top-college-athletic-departments-millions/#12d678f3abea 
[https://perma.cc/A5HF-KTPZ]; see also Steve Berkowitz & Erik Brady, Legalized Sports 
Betting Will Wreak Havoc on College Athletics. Or Not., USA TODAY (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2018/05/31/sports-betting-college-athletics-
world-concerned-supreme-court-ruling/645367002/ [https://perma.cc/7RDX-6EYL]. 
 7 See Murschel, supra note 1 (noting that for some schools, some of which saw a tax 
change under the new law, donations make up approximately fifty percent of their athletics 
budget); see also Kisska-Schulze, supra note 2, at 348 (pertaining to the repeal of the 
charitable deduction). 
 8 John Keilman, Should Sports Gambling Become Legal in Illinois, Will You Be Able 
to Wager on Illini, Wildcats or Huskies? Don’t Bet on It., CHI. TRIB. (May 9, 2019), 
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Although commentators predict the TCJA will have a direct negative impact 
on college athletic departments,9 it signifies a greater trend of decreased public 
university funding throughout the United States.10 Colleges have expressed 
reservations that increased legal gambling may escalate the risks of games being 
fixed.11 These concerns may, however, be misguided. This Article argues that 
college administrators should redirect attention towards embracing legalized 
sports wagering as a means of increasing the integrity of collegiate sporting 
events,12 expanding partnerships, and seeking a new source of revenue to 
supplement income lost due to the TCJA.13 Murphy opened the door for colleges 
and universities to capitalize on gambling tax revenue. 
Taxing gambling has a contentious history, nearly as controversial as 
legalizing gambling. The first federal gambling excise tax passed in 1951 at a 
rate of ten percent of betting handle.14 It was subsequently reduced to two 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-met-college-sports-betting-illinois-20190501 
-story.html [https://perma.cc/5PTY-JZ8R]; Ryan Rodenberg, NCAA Pivots to Address 
Sports Betting Integrity, ESPN (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/ 
26229344/how-ncaa-pivoting-address-sports-betting-integrity [https://perma.cc/WV6D 
-45M6]; Kyle Rowland, A Sure Bet? Universities Wrestle with Potential Impact of Betting, 
TOL. BLADE (Aug. 4, 2018), https://www.toledoblade.com/sports/college/2018/08/04/A-
sure-bet-Universities-wrestle-with-potential-impact-of-sports-betting/stories/20180804003 
[https://perma.cc/DX83-8PQF]. 
 9 See Kyle Rowland, College Athletic Departments Wrestle with Impact of Tax Bill, 
TOL. BLADE (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.toledoblade.com/College/2018/02/02/College-
athletic-departments-wrestle-with-impact-of-tax-bill.html [https://perma.cc/AQ3R-H9SJ]. 
 10 See MICHAEL MITCHELL ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, UNKEPT 
PROMISES: STATE CUTS TO HIGHER EDUCATION THREATEN ACCESS AND EQUITY 1 (Oct. 
2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/unkept-promises-state-cuts-
to-higher-education-threaten-access-and [https://perma.cc/75V8-HLWE]. 
 11 See Dennis Dodd, How to Fix a College Football Game and Influence Its Outcome—
In Four Steps, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
football/news/how-to-fix-a-college-football-game-and-influence-its-outcome-in-four-
steps/ [https://perma.cc/A3L7-SV7Y]. While many college administrators have expressed 
concerns that increased legal sports wagering opportunities will increase match-fixing of 
college sports, most sophisticated match-fixers generally seek to avoid regulated markets, 
which are typically well-monitored and capable of identifying many match-fixing schemes, 
often before a game ever begins. See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The Sports 
Bribery Act: A Law and Economics Approach, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 453, 468 (2015). 
 12 See John Holden, Match Fixing and Other Manipulations in Sports Betting: A 
Primer, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20922/match-fixing-
primer-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/MJ52-FS7Z] (last updated June 6, 2018). 
 13 See Jill R. Dorson, How States Are Spending Their Sports Betting Tax Revenue, 
SPORTSHANDLE (Oct. 25, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/how-states-are-spending-their-
sports-betting-tax-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/2UNU-VWKR] (discussing how states that 
have legalized sports wagering in the wake of the Murphy decision have decided to allocate 
the new revenue). 
 14 See John E. Coons, The Federal Gambling Tax and the Constitution, 43 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 637, 637 (1953); see also Eric Ramsey, Nevada 
Congresswoman Calls for End to Federal Sports Betting Handle Tax, LEGAL SPORTS REP. 
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/16955/federal-sports-betting-handle-
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percent, and again to 0.25% in 1984, which remains in effect today.15 Federal 
excise tax revenue is allocated to uses that the federal government deems 
necessary, though in 2018 Senators Schumer and Hatch introduced legislation 
designating tax revenue for use by a national gambling monitoring body.16 
Allocating gambling funds to sources, including education, remains possible 
due in part to that bill failing in 2018.17 
Indeed, there has long been a connection between gambling revenue and 
education.18 Historically, the challenge for educators has been to keep gaming 
money from being deployed to other state interests.19 Of the states that have 
legalized sports wagering, many are directing excess revenue to general funds; 
however, Nevada and Washington, D.C. have specifically earmarked sports 
betting revenue for educational purposes.20 While states often reallocate money 
reserved for education to other causes,21 the nascent sports betting market is 
relatively well positioned for the imposition of a small tax or fee on sports bets 
made in order to benefit institutions of higher education.  
This Article proposes that public colleges and universities actively lobby for 
state legislatures to impose a gambling interchange fee (GIF) on wagers made 
on college sporting events to compensate for economic losses suffered as a 
result of the TCJA, as well as states’ reallocation of funding away from higher 
education.22 Unlike “integrity fees,” which have been unsuccessfully promoted 
by professional sports leagues that already receive significant subsidies from 
taxpayers and private companies, a GIF would attach only to wagers made on 
                                                                                                                     
tax/ [https://perma.cc/Y5TG-ZSJT]. Betting handle refers to the amount of money wagered. 
Id. 
 15 Kevin P. Braig, Reform the Federal Sports Betting Excise Tax “Dilemma,” 
LEXOLOGY (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2b160213-
645e-48bf-b484-f7bcb6941831 [https://perma.cc/MS2K-K9VP]. 
 16 Holden, supra note 5, at 591–92.  
 17 Joss Wood, Federal Government Wants a Piece of Sports Betting Action, Says Sen. 
Hatch, PLAYUSA (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.playusa.com/federal-government-legal-
sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/5H4P-EWUS]. 
 18 Mimi Kirk, For Schools, Gambling Funding Is No Jackpot, CITYLAB (Feb. 21, 
2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/02/for-schools-gambling-funding-is-no-
jackpot/516927/ [https://perma.cc/4ZYV-N49J]. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Dorson, supra note 13. 
 21 See, e.g., Is the Texas Lottery Really Funding Education?, KCBD, https://www 
.kcbd.com/story/14579932/kcbd-investigates-is-the-tx-lottery-really-funding-education/ 
[https://perma.cc/YP82-VVHG] (last updated June 23, 2011). 
 22 While there is not an intellectual property right associated with the playing of a 
sporting event that mandates compensation, unlike professional team sports which are 
operated by private entities who seek to maximize revenues, public colleges and universities 
serve a public interest and do not seek profit maximization, and thus have greater justification 
in seeking an earmark than professional sports leagues, despite the fact that neither is entitled 
by law to a payment as result of wagering being offered on the contests that they facilitate. 
See generally Ryan M. Rodenberg et al., “Whose” Game Is It? Sports-Wagering and 
Intellectual Property, 60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 1 (2014). 
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college sporting events and be earmarked for disbursement back into states’ 
underfunded public institutions.23 These fees would not only benefit colleges 
and universities directly, but provide revenue to account for expenses tied to 
monitoring sports-related integrity concerns.24 
To fully evaluate these issues and proposal, this Article is divided into four 
substantive sections, followed by a conclusion. Part II examines the sports 
gambling landscape and what lies ahead following the Murphy decision. Part III 
analyzes the historical connection between gambling and educational funding. 
Part IV provides an overview of the state tax frameworks surrounding sports 
gambling, and the TCJA’s impact on higher education. Part V proposes that 
colleges and universities pursue a stake in funding from states now legalizing 
sports gambling through the imposition of a GIF. In conclusion, this Article 
suggests that colleges and universities could recoup some of their economic 
losses suffered if, instead of opposing sports wagering outright, they act 
strategically to attract a portion of this newfound revenue.  
II. MURPHY V. NCAA—OPENING NEW DOORS FOR SPORTS WAGERING 
When Justice Alito wrote that the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (PASPA) unconstitutionally commandeered state legislatures 
into maintaining laws prohibiting sports wagering,25 a wave of states expressed 
interest in authorizing sports betting.26 States’ interests had little to do with 
giving individuals access to an activity that many were already illegally engaged 
in, but much to do with seeking a new revenue stream.27 Seemingly gone from 
the contemporary discussion about expanding sports betting are moral concerns 
that drove much of PASPA’s initial support.28 The pre-Murphy era represented 
a very different time for how Americans and politicians perceived sports betting. 
                                                                                                                     
 23 The integrity fee is a fee that the NBA and Major League Baseball have repeatedly 
sought from states seeking to legalize sports wagering. It was initially suggested that the fee 
would compensate the leagues for added costs resulting from threats to the integrity of 
sporting events, like fixed games, as a result of legalized gambling. But, the language 
surrounding the fee changed to “royalty,” despite there not being a property right associated 
with sports gambling that would typically receive such a fee. In reality, what the leagues 
sought was a private tax of sorts. See John Holden, When They Say Integrity Fee, Are Pro 
Sports Leagues Really Asking for a Private Tax?, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/26361/pro-sports-leagues-integrity-fee-private-tax/ 
[https://perma.cc/H9GS-TLPK]. 
 24 See infra Part V.C. 
 25 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). 
 26 See Matt Volz & Geoff Mulvihill, Handful of US States Are Poised to Legalize Sports 
Betting, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/3ab98743f50a4 
a49a2fe64655234d495 [https://perma.cc/9D3H-UUTU]. 
 27 See Phil Helsel, Sports Betting Is Now Legal in Several States. Many Others Are 
Watching from the Sidelines., NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/us-news/sports-betting-now-legal-several-states-many-others-are-watching-n894211 
[https://perma.cc/27NH-D4EU]. 
 28 See Holden, supra note 3, at 350–51. 
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To better understand Murphy’s evolution and ultimate impact, this Part proceeds 
as follows: Section A discusses the history of gambling in the United States pre-
Murphy, Section B analyzes the dichotomy of disputes leading to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in the case, Section C examines states’ 
momentum to legalize sports gambling post-Murphy, and Section D opines on 
the impact of Murphy on higher education. 
A. Pre-Murphy 
America’s connection with gaming began more than 100 years before the 
establishment of the nation itself.29 The Jamestown lottery, as it was known at 
the time, funded the first English colony in North America.30 Lotteries were far 
from the only gambling activities with which Americans engaged in prior to 
independence. New York first established horse racing in 1666.31 Lotteries 
during the pre-Revolution era were the most feasible means of funding both 
private and public infrastructure projects, as banks were not sufficiently 
widespread to make them accessible to many colonial areas.32 In the years 
leading to the Civil War, gambling in America fell out of favor, and many states 
embedded anti-gambling provisions into their new constitutions.33 After the 
Civil War, much of the opposition to gambling and lotteries was dismissed, 
particularly since Reconstruction funds were needed and a lottery was preferred 
over a legislated tax.34 
During this period, Western expansion brought significant levels of 
gambling to the West; however, as cities developed, gambling became 
abbreviated.35 In 1890, transportation improvements benefitted lotteries, and 
congressional concerns about the distribution of interstate lottery materials 
resulted in a federal ban on mailed lottery circulations.36 Scandals associated 
with the lotteries, combined with Congress’s clampdown, led to a legal 
gambling depression until 1931, when Nevada re-legalized casino gambling.37 
It was not until 1964 that New Hampshire became the first state to re-authorize 
a state lottery.38  
The 1960s were an important era for federal anti-gambling legislation; while 
most states maintained gambling prohibitions, organized crime developed a 
                                                                                                                     
 29 Ken Zurski, The Jamestown Lottery, UNREMEMBERED (Jan. 13, 2016), https:// 
unrememberedhistory.com/2016/01/13/the-jamestown-lottery/ [https://perma.cc/GG5D 
-H2Z2]. 
 30 Id. 
 31 I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 361, 368 (2010). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 369. 
 34 Id. at 370. 
 35 Id. at 370–71. 
 36 Id. at 372. 
 37 Rose, supra note 31, at 374.  
 38 Id. 
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monopoly on the industry, and in particular, they focused on bookmaking.39 In 
1961, Congress passed the Wire Act based on recommendations from the 
Kefauver Committee,40 which conducted a fourteen-city tour of the country 
investigating organized crime.41 Along with the Travel Act,42 and the Wagering 
Paraphernalia Act,43 Congress sought to target organized crime’s money-
making operations. The legislature passed an omnibus crime bill in 1970, adding 
to the 1960s legislation that included one of the federal government’s most 
powerful tools for disrupting gambling activities, the Illegal Gambling Business 
Act.44 
In 1990, Congress first attempted to pass a bill that would eventually 
become PASPA.45 Originally, it was not a criminal law or civil prohibition; 
instead, it was a piece of legislation regulating intellectual property rights.46 
Two years later, the intellectual property bill morphed into a statute referred to 
as an “oddity” and “Orwellian.”47 PASPA was no longer an intellectual property 
statute; it instead unleashed a sports gambling ice age.48 The bill froze state laws 
in place, allowing states that were already operating sports betting schemes to 
continue, while estopping states that had not been offering sports betting at the 
time of passage.49 There was, however, an exception made for a single 
jurisdiction that was granted a one-year window to enact a law allowing sports 
wagering.50 The one-year window for Atlantic City, New Jersey closed without 
the state exercising its right, leaving Nevada as the sole jurisdiction with 
sportsbook style wagering.51 
                                                                                                                     
 39 See generally DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMING PROHIBITION AND 
THE INTERNET (2005). 
 40 See John Holden, Legislative Sausage Making: How We Got the Wire Act, Part Two, 
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/22329/making-the-
wire-act-sports-betting-part-two/ [https://perma.cc/J2LL-PPKT]. 
 41 See John Holden, Legislative Sausage Making: How We Got the Wire Act, Part One, 
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/22329/making-the-
wire-act-sports-betting-part-two/ [https://perma.cc/339N-XAPX]. 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014). 
 43 Id. § 1953. 
 44 Id. § 1955. The Illegal Gambling Business Act effectively criminalizes intrastate 
gambling activity provided that the business involves more than five people, is in 
substantially continuous operation for thirty days, or has gross receipts of $2000 in a single 
day. Id.  
 45 Holden, supra note 3, at 337. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has an Equal Sovereignty 
Problem, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
 48 See Holden, supra note 3, at 350–53. 
 49 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (1988). 
 50 Id. § 3704(3). While the statute makes no geographic reference by the terms used, 
only Atlantic City, New Jersey qualified. See id. 
 51 Holden, supra note 3, at 354. Various states had limited exemptions; most commonly 
Delaware, Oregon, and Montana are cited for their limited exemptions, but certain activities 
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After Congress passed PASPA, Atlantic City—otherwise known as 
“America’s Playground”—struggled financially.52 Gambling revenues 
decreased, as did airport and road traffic.53 The city faced competition from a 
variety of places, including Pennsylvania, which legalized casino gambling after 
PASPA passed.54 It was Atlantic City’s decline that primed New Jersey to seek 
legalized sports gambling in an effort to boost tourism back into the city.55 
New Jersey lawmakers sought to recapture a portion of the purported 
hundreds of billions of illegally wagered dollars.56 The exact size of the illegal 
sports wagering market is not known, but estimates range from $80 billion to 
$650 billion.57 State lawmakers hoped that regulated gambling would draw 
funds otherwise routed to illegal bookmakers, even if only a small percentage 
of market reserves were recaptured.58 In 2012, Chris Christie, then-Governor of 
New Jersey, signed a law authorizing the state’s casinos and racetracks to offer 
sportsbook-style betting.59 
B. Murphy: The Long Road to “Unconstitutional Commandeering” 
Almost immediately following Governor Christie’s signing of the 2012 bill 
into law, a quintet of sports organizations—the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA), the National Football League (NFL), the National 
Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL), and Major 
League Baseball (MLB)—sued the Governor and other New Jersey officials 
under a PASPA provision granting sports organizations the same power to 
enforce the statute as the U.S. Attorney General.60 The district court opinion, in 
what would become known as Christie I, was a near-total success for the sports 
organizations.61 The plaintiffs prevailed on PASPA being a rational exercise of 
                                                                                                                     
like wagering on Keirin bicycle racing is legal in New Mexico. Id.; see also Rodenberg & 
Holden, supra note 47, at 15–16. 
 52 See Suzette Parmley, Telltale Signs of Hard Times in Atlantic City, PHILA. INQUIRER 
(Aug. 19, 2009), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/20090819_Telltale_signs_ 
of_hard_times_in_Atlantic_City.html [https://perma.cc/V7CL-GB73]. 
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. 
 55 Brent Johnson & Keith Sargeant, Here’s All You Need to Know About N.J. Sports 
Betting Before It Launches on Thursday, NJ.COM (June 12, 2018), https://www.nj.com/ 
politics/2018/06/all_you_need_to_know_as_nj_legalizes_sports_betting.html [https:  
//perma.cc/V7TN-AZP7]. 
 56 Anastasios Kaburakis et al., Inevitable: Sports Gambling, State Regulation, and the 
Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 27–28 (2015). 
 57 John T. Holden, Legalized Sports Betting in Oklahoma, OKLA. B.J. (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.okbar.org/barjournal/oct2018/obj8926holden/ [https://perma.cc/C7QL-J2WT]; 
If Vote Gets to Floor, Nevada Could Be in Trouble, ESPN (Jan. 30, 2001), http://www.espn 
.com/ncaa/news/2001/0130/1051772.html [https://perma.cc/PWV2-7PWH]. 
 58 Holden, supra note 5, at 577–78. 
 59 Holden, supra note 3, at 356. 
 60 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013). 
 61 See id. at 579 (holding for the sports organizations). 
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Congress’s Commerce Clause powers that were found to neither offend the 
Tenth nor Fourteenth Amendments, nor violate the “Equal Footing Doctrine.”62 
The defendants appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.63 
The panel returned a two-one decision in favor of the sports organizations.64 
The majority held that the leagues have standing to sue the state to stop 
implementation of the law, and that PASPA was a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers.65 The Third Circuit further held that PASPA did not 
impermissibly commandeer the states, stating, “PASPA does not require or 
coerce the states to lift a finger—they are not required to pass laws, to take title 
to anything, to conduct background checks, to expend any funds, or to in any 
way enforce federal law.”66 The Supreme Court’s decisions in New York and 
Printz formed the basis for the New Jersey defendants’ arguments, as it was 
their contention that PASPA required the state legislature to refrain from 
exercising their sovereign power to pass and repeal laws, without offering a 
supplemental federal regulatory scheme on which it could rely if the state chose 
not to enforce its laws any longer.67 Nor did the Third Circuit find support for 
the defendant’s argument that PASPA violated the Tenth Amendment, or that 
the law violated the equal sovereignty principle that states must be treated 
substantially the same.68 Despite a dissenting opinion by Third Circuit Judge 
Vanaskie, who argued that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering principle, 
the sports leagues prevailed on appeal in Christie I,69 and again when the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.70 
Not to be deterred, in 2014 New Jersey repealed its laws prohibiting sports 
betting71 as proposed by the Solicitor General’s office.72 Following the repeal, 
the sports organization quintet sued the state for a second time.73 District Court 
Judge Michael Shipp—who oversaw Christie I—found that the law partially 
repealing New Jersey’s 2012 law still ran afoul of PASPA and struck it down.74 
Once more the state appealed to the Third Circuit, where it again lost by a two-
one decision; however, this time, attorneys for the state convinced Judge 
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Fuentes—who wrote the majority opinion in Christie I—that the 2012 repeal 
was PASPA-compliant.75 In October of 2015, the state’s petition for rehearing 
en banc was granted. Despite being granted the somewhat extraordinary 
rehearing en banc, New Jersey lost for the sixth time in six attempts.76 The 
state’s 9-3 loss at the Third Circuit en banc hearing left the state with one final 
attempt to appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court for a second time.77 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether PASPA 
impermissibly coerced state legislatures into maintaining laws in June of 2017, 
and heard oral arguments in December that same year.78 On May 14, 2018, the 
Supreme Court issued a decision in the Murphy case (Christie II), holding that 
“[t]he PASPA provision at issue here—prohibiting state authorization of sports 
gambling—violates the anticommandeering rule. That provision unequivocally 
dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.”79 The Supreme Court 
further held that PASPA could not be saved by severing the portions of the law 
that impermissibly commandeered state legislatures, as without those, the 
statute would necessarily fail; unlike under permissible preemption schemes, 
there was no federal framework that the state could default to for enforcement.80 
In concurrence, Justice Thomas further opined that while PASPA impermissibly 
commandeered the state’s legislature, he was unconvinced that sports gambling 
was an interstate commerce issue.81 The Murphy decision resulted in PASPA 
being deemed unconstitutional and, consequently, interested states could pass 
laws regulating sportsbook style sports wagering outside of Nevada for the first 
time since 1992.82 
C. Post-Murphy  
Even prior to the Supreme Court issuing the Murphy decision, states had 
begun preparing for a post-PASPA landscape. New York and Pennsylvania 
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passed legislation to legalize sports gambling in the event of PASPA’s failure, 
whether it came judicially or legislatively.83 While there was great exuberance 
from coast to coast following the removal of the federal prohibition, the reality 
of passing gaming legislation slowed much of the early state momentum.84 Still, 
despite the challenges of crafting sports betting regulations, with various 
stakeholders seeking a portion of the finite revenues, more than thirty states have 
now introduced bills to legalize sports betting since May 14, 2018.85 
Aside from Nevada, which has experienced legalized sportsbook-style 
betting since 1931, several states took early advantage of the newfound 
opportunity.86 While observers assumed New Jersey would offer sportsbook-
style wagering shortly after the Murphy decision,87 Delaware accepted the first 
wagers.88 New Jersey began accepting wagers shortly thereafter, and became 
the first state outside Nevada to allow mobile sports wagering.89 Included in the 
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initial wave of states to legalize sports betting were Mississippi,90 West 
Virginia,91 Pennsylvania,92 and Rhode Island.93 
In addition, Arkansas legalized sports betting via a referendum in 2018.94 
Iowa,95 Indiana,96 and Montana all legalized sports betting in May 2019.97 
Following these early movers, Tennessee passed a sports betting law that was 
significant, as it was the first to mandate that sportsbook operators purchase 
official data from sports leagues98—a legally dubious mandate99—without a 
commercial justification.100 After failing to secure an official data order in the 
first year after Murphy, the sports leagues achieved a second victory in Illinois 
                                                                                                                     
 90 See Adam Candee, New Day for Ole Miss as Mississippi Sports Betting Launches, 
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/22474/mississippi-
sports-betting-launches/ [https://perma.cc/X9TY-RATS]. 
 91 Kim Yuhl, Sports Betting in West Virginia Launching Sept. 1, https://www.playusa 
.com/west-virginia-sports-betting-launch/ [https://perma.cc/B5S7-A7R5] (last updated 
Mar. 14, 2019). 
 92 Nicholaus Garcia, PA Sports Betting Is Finally Here: Hollywood Casino Is Taking 
First Wagers Today, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/25946/first-
pennsylvania-casino-ready-for-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/DC3D-7YHZ] (last updated 
Nov. 16, 2018). 
 93 Gintautas Dumcius, Legalized Sports Betting to Start in Rhode Island, MASSLIVE, 
https://www.masslive.com/news/2018/11/legalized_sports_betting_to_st.html [https:  
//perma.cc/AC92-ZQU6] (last updated Jan. 29, 2019). 
 94 David Fucillo, Arkansas Voters Pass Issue 4, Issuing Licenses to Four Casinos that 
Includes Potential Sports Gambling, SBNATION (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.sbnation 
.com/nfl/2018/11/7/18070884/arkansas-midterm-election-results-2018-issue-4-casino 
-licenses-sports-gambling [https://perma.cc/8W3F-265S]. 
 95 Sean Gruber-Miller & Ian Richardson, When Can Iowans Start Wagering on Sports? 
Bet on Football Season., DES MOINES REG., https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/ 
news/politics/2019/05/14/sports-betting-iowa-legal-online-when-kim-reynolds-casino 
-draftkings-fanduel-states-prairie-meadows/3665492002/ [https://perma.cc/CK3U-QS 
ER] (last updated May 15, 2019). 
 96 Brian Pempus, It’s Official: Indiana Becomes 10th State to Legalize Sports Betting, 
SPORTSHANDLE (May 8, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/indiana-sports-betting-becomes-
legal/ [https://perma.cc/TXW2-7S9H]. 
 97 Adam Candee, Montana Sports Betting Improbably First to the Finish Line in 2019, 
LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32061/montana-sports-betting-bill-
signed/ [https://perma.cc/4HGD-F8HA] (last updated May 6, 2019).  
 98 Official League Data, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/ 
official-league-data/ [https://perma.cc/4T92-CLZ5] (last updated Feb. 14, 2020). 
 99 See John Holden & Mike Schuster, The Sham of Integrity Fees in Sports Betting, 16 
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 31, 48 (2019). 
 100 Brett Smiley, MLB, Sportradar Ink Sports Betting Data Deal as Controversy Brews, 
SPORTSHANDLE (Feb. 27, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/mlb-sportradar-announce-
betting-data-deal/ [https://perma.cc/2TDM-GUL9]; see also Brett Smiley, How ‘Unofficial’ 
Sports Betting Data May Be Better than ‘Official League Data,’ SPORTSHANDLE (June 5, 
2019), https://sportshandle.com/unofficial-official-league-data/ [https://perma.cc/X6A5-
B6JW] (explaining why “unofficial” data may deliver a better betting experience, be more 
accurate, and possibly be better suited for the flow of major U.S. sports and bettors for those 
contests). 
478 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:3 
when the state legislature granted an official mandate involving certain types of 
in-play wagers.101 While numerous states have expressed an interest in offering 
sports wagering, many hold complicated relationships with Tribal governments 
that dictate mandatory negotiating between the state-tribe and approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior before the state can offer sports wagering.102 
For example, New Mexico, which sought an exemption for Keirin bike 
racing during PASPA’s legislative hearings,103 has launched sports wagering at 
five tribal casinos.104 The Santa Ana Star Casino and Hotel was the first to 
introduce sports wagering in New Mexico, which was the result of permissive 
language used in the gaming compact between the state and the Tribe.105 In fact, 
the gaming compact grants virtually unfettered ability to New Mexico tribes to 
offer Class III gaming activities like sports betting, stating, “Permitted Class III 
Gaming. The Tribe may conduct, only on Indian Lands, subject to all of the 
terms and conditions of this Compact, any or all forms of Class III Gaming.”106 
The agreement between state and Tribal governments seemingly grants the 
tribes, subject to the compact, extensive authority to authorize Class III gaming 
at their facilities.107 The New Mexico tribal compact is very permissive, 
allowing the Santa Ana Pueblo and subsequently Pojoaque Pueblo108 to begin 
accepting wagers. The compact’s language is also exceptional, as most 
compacts specifically address which activities are permissible.109 Sports 
wagering negotiations between Tribes and other states like Florida and 
Oklahoma, which have significant Tribal gaming infrastructure but lack a large 
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Tribal gaming footprint, will likely fall behind states like New Mexico.110 
Indeed, despite the gaudy numbers often associated with sports betting, the 
activity is a relatively low-margin product for gaming operators.111 Tribes must 
carefully evaluate whether to open up Tribal gaming compacts and risk giving 
up something to state governments in order to offer a product that will not likely 
add significant value to a casino’s bottom line.112 
Despite the relatively low profit margins, legalized sports wagering has 
attracted a number of foreign sports wagering companies, as well as welcomed 
the conversion of the two largest daily fantasy sports providers into sports 
wagering operators.113 These companies have also moved from online-only 
fantasy sports platforms to mobile and brick-and-mortar sports betting 
operators.114 Both FanDuel and DraftKings have had immediate success, 
particularly in the mobile betting space, and quickly acquired more than seventy 
percent of New Jersey’s online gambling market share.115 While states have 
been slow to adopt regulations and launch mobile wagering, the potential to 
capitalize on additional revenue is clear.116 However, collegiate athletics 
administrators remain adamant in opposing legalized sports wagering.117 
D. Murphy’s Impact on Collegiate Athletics 
The impact of Murphy on collegiate sports remains to be seen in the 
protracted litigation against the State of New Jersey.118 College athletic 
administrators have long opposed legalized gambling for fear that gamblers 
would induce student-athletes into manipulating matches.119 College athletes 
are perhaps vulnerable to match-fixers by virtue of their poverty; as amateur 
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athletes they may not receive the multi-million dollar salaries of professional 
athletes.120 Since match-fixers have historically targeted student-athletes, 
college administrators may harbor legitimate fears.121 
Concerns that legalized gambling will promote match-fixing and increase 
gambling amongst collegiate athletes are largely speculative.122 Some states 
have acknowledged college athletic departments’ apprehensions by placing 
bans on in-state collegiate team wagering in order to limit student-athletes’ 
exposure to would-be match-manipulators.123 The challenge for college 
administrators is that while such fears are theoretical, athletic departments and 
universities will face increased monitoring and compliance costs until sports 
gambling is proven safe. Part III addresses the evolving relationship between 
gambling funding and education in the United States. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF GAMBLING FUNDING EDUCATION 
Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. economy lapsed into a recession 
that eventually culminated in a period referred to as the Great Recession.124 The 
nation’s financial erosion caused Congress to curtail state and local 
governmental funding, forcing states to procure alternative revenue sources to 
offset lost subsidies.125 Taxes on alcohol, cigarettes, strip clubs, soda, and 
marijuana emerged, furnishing innovative opportunities to boost state revenue 
production streams.126 In addition, some states launched significant legal battles 
to expose fresh avenues of revenue, including successes in collecting sales taxes 
from nonresident online retailers and the newly expanded legalized gaming 
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activities.127 Revenue from these various sources ultimately falls into one or 
more state buckets—either a general fund to be used for broad discretionary 
purposes, or into numerous designated (earmarked) reserves for use toward 
specified public services.128 
To a certain degree, every state earmarks a percentage of tax revenue to fund 
governmental activities.129 Earmarked beneficiaries vary extensively but tend to 
include highways and roadways, local government programs, education, health 
and welfare, and environmental causes.130 Likewise, the sources of dedicated 
revenue are diverse, often complementing the political atmosphere of the 
jurisdiction.131 These sources may take the form of either “sin taxes” on items 
such as tobacco, alcohol, or soda, or Pigouvian taxes on select pollutants, like 
motor fuel.132  
Funding higher education has long challenged state governments.133 While 
a significant portion of earmarked revenue supports state K-12 programs,134 the 
Great Recession forced jurisdictions to reduce their fiscal support of post-
secondary education.135 This alteration placed a hefty burden on colleges and 
universities, requiring them to seek unique outlets to supplement about forty-
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seven percent of their total overhead costs.136 As a result, tuitions magnified, 
online enrollments increased, federal aid programs expanded, students 
borrowed, programs and faculty lines were cut, and charitable donations became 
critical to the vitality of higher education.137 These changes have resulted in a 
cost-value educational crisis in the United States, with public institutions 
becoming less affordable and accessible amid quality erosion.138 There is no 
shortage of academic scholarship devoted to addressing this cataclysm in higher 
education.139 
In the ten years following the 2008 recession, states collectively spent $9 
billion less on higher education than they did in the year preceding its start.140 
While five states spent more money per student in 2017 than they did in 2008, 
most states decreased funding by about sixteen percent per student during that 
period, and funding in eight states fell by more than thirty percent.141 Budget 
cuts have largely been passed onto students, who today each contribute roughly 
$1800 more toward university budgets than in the previous ten year period.142 
Governmental spending on higher education has diminished by twenty-five 
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percent.143 Financial challenges have long been part and parcel of operating 
higher education institutions, and history supports that state lottery revenues 
have helped keep higher education in operation.144 To examine the developing 
partnership between lotteries and higher education, this Part proceeds as 
follows: Section A discusses the early history of the American lottery system, 
Section B examines contemporary applications of lottery revenue for 
educational purposes, and Section C scrutinizes state initiatives to reallocate 
lottery funds away from education. 
A. Early History 
While modern gambling in America largely began around 1950, several 
hundred years earlier gambling played a very different role in the United 
States.145 The first lottery in England is believed to have been drawn in 1569 
and was intended to generate funds for harbor repairs and other public works 
projects.146 English lotteries evolved, with the Crown finding them useful 
revenue mechanisms for a variety of projects, including plantation funding in 
the Virginia colony.147 As Europeans colonized America, they brought their 
English gaming traditions with them, though Puritan rule resulted in statutes 
dating to 1631 that banned gambling in states like Massachusetts.148 Lotteries, 
however, received different treatment than card and dice games.149 Lotteries 
were a necessity for American colonists.150 Prior to 1790, the country had only 
three incorporated banks, and the Crown kept a tight grip on funding going to 
the New World.151 As a result, colonists were forced to find alternative ways to 
generate revenue in order to develop, and provide for, colonial defense.152 
Lotteries were initially used as a private tool but quickly spread as a popular 
funding mechanism for both public and private uses.153 While Massachusetts 
imposed a twenty-pound fine for running a lottery in 1719, colonists were able 
to avoid the fines by entering lotteries in other colonies that were less averse to 
the contests.154 Despite the passage of law meant to rein in New York lotteries 
in 1721, lotteries remained popular, and many were even state-run despite the 
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restriction.155 Indeed, it was during this era that one of the first linkages between 
the lottery and higher education took place, as it was by means of a lottery that 
Kings College (now Columbia University) was established.156 Pennsylvania 
similarly utilized a lottery for the construction and initial operation of Dickinson 
College.157 New York and Pennsylvania were not isolated in their use of 
lotteries for establishing universities: Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, Princeton, and 
William and Mary were all at least partially established using funds from 
lotteries.158 
Following the Civil War, lotteries and gambling taxes became an important 
means of generating revenue for the reconstruction of the South and the 
establishment of more than fifty universities.159 Lotteries in the 1800s were 
typically privately run via a license obtained from the state.160 The 1800s also 
saw a rise in the number of scandals associated with lotteries, leading some 
lawmakers to question their continued operation.161 It was the Louisiana lottery 
that generated a scandal of such proportion that Congress took interest in 
banning the above discussed use of the mail for distribution of lottery materials, 
resulting in a seventy-year freeze on legal state-run lotteries.162  
B. Contemporary History 
In March of 1964, New Hampshire cities and towns voted to allow 
sweepstakes ticket sales.163 Two days later, the state became the first to sell 
lottery tickets in almost seven decades.164 Since the launch of the 1964 sales, 
forty-three other states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, 
implemented state-run lotteries.165 In 2008, Americans spent $60.6 billion on 
lottery tickets, and spent “well over a trillion dollars” across all gambling 
activities.166 Lotteries, in their contemporary iteration, serve two predominant 
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state purposes: first, to supplement the state’s general fund; and second, to 
supplement education funding.167 
Educational programs—particularly primary and secondary education—are 
paramount beneficiaries of various state earmarked tax revenues.168 For 
example, in 2005 Alabama earmarked forty-percent of its tax revenue from beer 
sales to fund public education.169 The first $40 million of Colorado’s annual tax 
revenue from marijuana sales goes to the Colorado Public School Capital 
Construction Assistance Fund, which subsidizes the Building Excellent Schools 
Today (BEST) grant program.170 Another major source of educational funding 
comes from gaming tax revenue.171 In particular, state lotteries serve as 
attractive options for profit realization dedicated to funding public education.172 
An example of this is the Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) 
scholarship program, which is wholly funded by the Georgia Lottery.173  
The practice of earmarking lottery proceeds for a specific cause within the 
state budget is common.174 One challenge facing lawmakers and funding 
recipients is maintaining additional revenue outlets, since states have a historical 
tendency to replace, rather than supplement, gaming revenues.175 Despite this 
setback, one study found that earmarking increases educational spending by 
more than thirty-five cents when compared to one non-earmarked dollar, 
suggesting the net benefit of gaming funds earmarked for educational funding 
has a positive effect.176 Presently, at least twenty states direct all of their lottery 
revenue to education, with others allocating at least a portion of the revenue 
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directly to education funding.177 However, the practice of earmarking has not 
resulted in funding actually reaching the state’s educational coffers.178 
C. Money Getting Reallocated? 
While lawmakers tout that state gambling dollars fund education, the reality 
is that the money earmarked for education is often usurped by other 
governmental agencies and expenses.179 The State of Maryland is a prime 
example. After legalizing casino gambling in 2008, Maryland’s casinos 
deposited $1.7 billion into the state’s education trust account.180 While the 
casino money is purportedly going to education, the state has reallocated some 
of that money to other state causes.181 Maryland is not an isolated case.182 
However, some state lotteries that fund scholarship programs, like Georgia’s 
HOPE Scholarship, continue to survive and retain promised lottery funding.183  
While sports betting currently remains a low-revenue gaming product for 
commercial operators,184 its legalization creates opportunities for increased 
state educational income sources. Facing an already steady decline of state 
funding for higher education, college athletic departments face new financial 
perils with the signing of the TCJA into law.185 In Part IV, we discuss the 
financial impact of the TCJA on college sports and the broader spectrum of 
higher education, and present current data regarding states’ initiatives to tax 
gambling revenue post-Murphy. 
IV. MURPHY, THE TCJA, AND COLLEGE SPORTS 
College sports are not immune to the effects of state funding cuts. 
Intercollegiate athletics are subsidized through two sources—allocated and 
generated revenues.186 Allocated revenues derive from student fees, institutions, 
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and state and local governmental support.187 Generated revenues are earned 
directly by athletic departments, and include income from ticket sales, 
broadcasting contracts, alumni donations, and royalties.188 Cumulatively, 
allocated and generated revenue subsidize coaching salaries, student-athlete 
grants-in-aid, recruitment expenditures, building and grounds maintenance, 
travel expenses, and uniforms.189 The revenue needed to cover these costs varies 
significantly across institutions, with most athletic programs falling in the 
red.190 In 2014, the average Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) athletic 
department subsidy from their parent institution was $14.7 million.191 With 
institutions regularly facing budget deficits, internal measures to offset athletic 
expenditures are growing, and include increased student fees, purging non-
revenue sports, and shifting budgets away from select academics.192  
Although not all agree that allocated revenue—like mandatory student 
fees—should be earmarked for college sports,193 successful university athletic 
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programs have positive impacts on institutional reputation.194 For some schools, 
university success is directly linked to athletic performance.195 Strong athletic 
programs boost enrollment, amplify college profiles, promote an internal culture 
of school spirit, and warrant long-term alumni relations.196 While most NCAA 
athletic programs depend on allocated revenue, self-sufficiency is increasing.197 
Football and men’s basketball programs—the revenue-generating sports at most 
institutions—have evolved into a billion-dollar industry.198  
The history of amateur sports commercialization dates back to the early part 
of the twentieth century.199 Since then, the economic demands of college sports 
have amplified their commercialization, particularly with respect to the “money 
sports” subsidizing non-revenue generating athletics.200 The discourse 
surrounding the big business of college sports exploded after Johnny Manziel’s 
“show me the money” gestures, Ed O’Bannon’s antitrust litigation, and 
Northwestern University football players’ attempt to unionize and bargain 
collectively.201 Although dialogue surrounding pay-for-play, professionalizing 
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colleges sports, and the continued arms race of coaching salaries continues to 
grow,202 the reality is that only a small fraction of university athletic programs 
generate revenue.203 Instead, like most academic and non-academic programs 
housed within college and university systems, allocated revenues are the 
lifeblood of college sports.204  
President Trump’s signing of the TCJA revolutionized the U.S. Tax 
Code.205 The law includes certain provisions that directly and negatively impact 
tax-exempt organizations, which include most colleges and universities.206 
Certain changes made to individual and corporate taxes could further exacerbate 
financial ramifications for higher education. In addition, select provisions 
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directly target college sports.207 Combined, these changes could have serious 
impacts on higher education and collegiate athletics, resulting in the need for 
universities and their affiliated sports programs to secure new methods of 
funding. The Murphy decision could promulgate innovative channels for state 
governments to reinforce financial support to college athletic programs and 
higher education as a whole. To better analyze this initiative, it is important to 
first address the TCJA’s effect on colleges and universities, as well as the 
evolving state tax frameworks post-Murphy. To examine these issues, this Part 
proceeds as follows: Section A discusses the impact of the TCJA on higher 
education, to include collegiate athletic programs, and Section B introduces the 
current status of state tax gambling initiatives. 
A. The Impact of the TCJA on Higher Education 
The TCJA significantly reformed U.S. federal tax legislation for the first 
time in over thirty years,208 affecting virtually every echelon of the American 
economy.209 As part of the overhaul, individual income tax rates and brackets 
were reduced.210 The corporate tax rate transitioned from a graduated scale to a 
flat twenty-one percent.211 The standard deduction substantially increased,212 
while the highest individual tax rate dropped to thirty-seven percent.213 Moving 
costs and alimony payments became non-deductible,214 as did business-related 
entertainment expenses.215 Numerous changes were made to taxing foreign 
income.216  
In addition, the TCJA introduced new provisions that could directly or 
indirectly affect higher education and the college sports arena. Five provisions 
will change how colleges, universities and athletic departments operate. These 
include: (1) increasing the standard deduction for individual taxpayers; (2) 
eliminating the deduction previously available to charitable donors’ receiving 
rights to athletic seating; (3) establishing a new excise tax on tax-exempt 
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organizations’ executive compensation; (4) including a new excise tax on 
private institutions’ endowments; and (5) providing new tax provisions for 
colleges and universities earning unrelated business income (UBI).217 Each of 
these provisions is discussed below separately. 
1. Charitable Giving and the Standard Deduction  
Following Congress’s reconstruction of the Tax Code, changes made that 
directly impact individual taxpayers could also have an indirect effect on 
charitable contributions made to higher education. Through 2025, individual 
taxpayers can elect to take a significantly higher standard deduction on their 
individual income tax returns than previously available.218 For most individuals, 
electing to itemize is no longer the optimal choice.219 A 2019 study found that 
eighty-eight percent of taxpayers will now elect the standard deduction in lieu 
of itemizing.220 Congressional data further estimates that 18 million households 
elected to itemize in 2018, down from 46.5 million in 2017.221  
A negative side effect of this change is that taxpayers electing the standard 
deduction may moderate or eliminate their charitable contributions moving 
forward. Without itemizing, 28.5 million households will lose the charitable tax 
benefit associated with gifting.222 Empirical evidence suggests that tax 
incentives directly affect gifting by lower and middle-class taxpayers.223 In fact, 
early indicators predict that doubling the standard deduction could result in a 
$12 to $20 billion reduction in annual gifting.224 Although recent data found 
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 218 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11021(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2072 (2017) (codified at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 63(c)(7)(A)(ii)). In 2017, the maximum standard deduction amounts were set at $6350 for 
individuals, $9350 for heads of household, and $12,700 for married filing jointly. The TCJA 
almost doubled those amounts, increasing the maximum thresholds to $12,000, $18,000, and 
$24,000 respectively. 
 219 See Gary Strauss, Higher Standard Deduction Means Fewer Taxpayers to Itemize, 
AARP (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.aarp.org/money/taxes/info-2018/new-standard-
deduction-fd.html [https://perma.cc/2X8C-2RVS]. 
 220 IND. UNIV. LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF PHILANTHROPY, CHARITABLE GIVING AND TAX 
INCENTIVES: ESTIMATING CHANGES IN CHARITABLE DOLLARS AND NUMBER OF DONORS 
RESULTING FROM FIVE POLICY PROPOSALS 7 (June 2019), https://independentsector.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Charitable-Giving-and-Tax-Incentives-Report-June2019 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5N8-A984] (data indicators for tax year 2018). 
 221 Jessica Dickler & Sharon Epperson, What the New Tax Law Means for Your 
Charitable Giving, CNBC (May 13, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/11/what-the-
new-tax-law-means-for-your-charitable-giving.html [https://perma.cc/V6LV-SKR2]. 
 222 IND. UNIV. LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF PHILANTHROPY, supra note 220, at 7. 
 223 Kisska-Schulze, supra note 2, at 370 (citing to Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social 
Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 
6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 340 (1997)).  
 224 Elizabeth King, Tax Reform, Mixed-Entity Markets, and Hospitals: How the 2017 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Favors the For-Profit Hospital Model, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
527, 574 (2019) (citing INDEP. SECTOR, 2017 FINAL TAX BILL SUMMARY, https:// 
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that contributions to colleges and universities actually exceeded record highs in 
2018, it also established that the total number of individual donors declined, 
suggesting that middle-income taxpayers were less inclined to make charitable 
donations last year as compared to wealthy donors.225  
2. Athletic Seating & Fringe Benefit Deductions 
Collegiate athletic departments depend on private contributions from 
alumni and boosters to subsidize their sports programs.226 Annually, NCAA 
Division I FBS fundraising accounts for $26.72 million.227 Earmarked gifts 
from private donors to college athletic departments often support the building, 
renovation, or expansion of athletics facilities.228 Smaller gifts help fund named 
scholarship endowments, academic opportunities for student-athletes, and 
athletic leadership programs.229  
Post-TCJA, donations made directly to college athletic departments could 
diminish due to the law’s repeal of the deduction allowed on contributions made 
in exchange for athletic seating rights.230 Particularly, the TCJA disallows the 
so-called “80-20 rule,” which permitted boosters an eighty percent deduction on 
gifts made in exchange for the right to buy tickets or seating at college athletic 
events.231 Faced with the unpredictability of how the new law would impact 
their budgets, some universities suggested that donors make multi-year 
contributions at the close of 2017 to mitigate immediate budget shortfalls and 
ensure that priority seating rights remained.232 In addition, the TCJA disallows 
companies to deduct fifty percent of the purchase price of tickets and stadium 
                                                                                                                     
independentsector.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2017-final-tax-bill-summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/465D-3JP6]). 
 225 Nick Hazelrigg, Larger Donations, Fewer Donors, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 20, 
2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/06/20/donations-colleges-are-number-
donors-down [https://perma.cc/E3VA-GBR7]. 
 226 Javonte U. Lipsey, Assessing Fundraising Practices of Intercollegiate Athletic 
Departments: An Empirical Analysis of Tiered Reward Systems 1 (2019) (unpublished 
Master’s thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Athletics, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY, https://www.insidephilanthropy.com/campus-
cash/athletics [https://perma.cc/F96F-SR3V]. 
 229 Id. 
 230 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13704, 131 Stat. 2054, 
2169 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 170(l)). 
 231 26 U.S.C. § 170(l)(B) (2018). 
 232 Darren Rovell, Tax Reform Nixes Season-Ticket Donation Deductions; Schools 
Scramble into Action, ESPN (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.espn.com/college-football/ 
story/_/id/21827570/tax-reform-bill-removes-deduction-donations-season-tickets-forcing 
-universities-make-other-plans [https://perma.cc/XK49-9FBY] (further noting that 
Southern Methodist University, Florida State, and the University of Oklahoma offered the 
multi-year contribution option to donors). 
2020] BETTING ON EDUCATION 493 
suites to concerts and sporting events for client entertainment purposes.233 
Eliminating these deductions could result in a decreased number of individual 
booster and corporate donations. 
3. Excise Tax on Executive Compensation 
The TCJA imposed a new twenty-one percent excise tax (equivalent to the 
new flat corporate tax rate) on the top five highest paid employees of tax-exempt 
organizations whose annual compensation exceeds $1 million.234 The tax 
likewise applies to excess parachute payments.235 The purpose of this tax was 
to better align compensation paid by tax-exempt organizations with for-profit 
companies.236 Tax-exempt organizations include corporations organized for 
educational purposes, as well as organizations fostering “national or 
international amateur sports competition.”237 Many public colleges, 
universities, and collegiate athletic programs could feel its impact.238 
Today, compensating collegiate coaching staff in excess of $1 million 
annually is the norm rather than the exception.239 The average college football 
coaching salary in 2018 was $2.6 million,240 with the top overall coaches’ 
salaries across the United States concentrated in football and men’s 
basketball.241 In fact, eight college basketball coaches and thirty-one college 
                                                                                                                     
 233 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 13304, 131 Stat. at 2124 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 274(a)(2018)). 
 234 Id. § 13602, 131 Stat. at 2157 (adding 26 U.S.C. § 4960(a)(1) (2018)). 
 235 Id. §§ 13602 (a)(1)–(2), (c)(2); see also Robert Lattinville & Roger Denny, How the 
New Excise Tax Impacts Coach Compensation, ATHLETICDIRECTORU, https://athletic 
directoru.com/articles/how-the-new-excise-tax-impacts-coach-compensation/ [https: 
//perma.cc/E78K-WQJP] (“[P]arachute payments are compensation paid upon the 
termination of the employee’s employment if the aggregate present value of such payment 
equals or exceeds three times the employee’s ‘base amount’ . . . .”). 
 236 See H.R. REP. 115-409, at 333 (2017) (“The Committee further believes that 
alignment of the tax treatment of excessive executive compensation (as top executives may 
inappropriately divert organizational resources into excessive compensation) between for-
profit and tax-exempt employers furthers the Committee’s larger tax reform effort of making 
the system fairer for all businesses.”). 
 237 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1730 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(2017)).  
 238 Betsy Field et al., IRS Provides Guidance to Tax-Exempt Organizations in Applying 
New 4960 Excise Tax, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.willis 
towerswatson.com/en-US/insights/2019/03/insider-irs-provides-guidance-to-tax-exempts 
-for-4960-excise-tax [https://perma.cc/87H9-6RDF]. 
 239 See Steve Berkowitz, Analysis: After Dabo Swinney’s Deal, How High Can College 
Football Salaries Go? Keep Watching., USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.usa 
today.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2019/04/26/college-football-salaries-no-ceiling-after-dabo-
swinney-deal/3591047002/ [https://perma.cc/5X9F-2H2A]. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Bobby Rich, The 25 Highest-Paid College Coaches of 2019, QUAD, https://the 
bestschools.org/magazine/highest-paid-college-coaches/ [https://perma.cc/7JXU-HTBZ]. 
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football coaches were the highest paid public employees in their state in 2017.242 
Lucrative coaching contracts propel the financial and successful endeavors of 
many college athletic departments, resulting in continued scholarly debates 
surrounding the arms race in collegiate coaching salaries.243 At the close of 
2017, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that over a ten-year period this 
new excise tax will provide $1.8 billion in revenue to the federal government.244 
Despite initial concerns regarding this provision, on December 31, 2018 the 
IRS issued interim guidance, establishing that the twenty-one percent tax “will 
not apply to salaries of more than $1 million paid to coaches of sports teams at 
state colleges and universities that abandon 501(c)(3) [tax-exempt] status but 
remain exempt from federal income tax as state instrumentalities.”245 Per this 
guidance, public colleges and universities can rely on the doctrine of implied 
sovereign immunity for tax-exempt status.246 The guidance clarified that 
institutions receiving a determination letter from the IRS recognizing their tax 
exempt status can proactively revoke such status, thus exempting them from the 
excise tax.247 However, a loophole was inadvertently created by Congress when 
drafting this provision, as public universities need not fall within the parameters 
of 501(c)(3) to enjoy tax-exempt status.248 Instead, as compared to private 
institutions, public colleges and universities are considered long-arms of the 
state and are therefore exempt from federal taxation.249 While public institutions 
                                                                                                                     




 243 Berry, supra note 189, at 213–14; see also Richard T. Karcher, The Coaching 
Carousel in Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics: Economic Implications and Legal 
Considerations, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2009) (analyzing the 
economics of college coaching contracts); Ted Tatos, An Empirical Evaluation of EADA and 
NCAA College Sports Financial Data: Applications for Research and Litigation, 29 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 411 (2019) (evaluating the reliability of college athletics financial data); 
Wuerdeman, supra note 192, at 85 (analyzing the arms race in college coaching salaries 
against antitrust law). 
 244 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE 
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT”—FISCAL YEARS 2018−2027, JCX-
67-17 (2017) (for fiscal years 2018 to 2027). 
 245 I.R.S. Notice 2019-09 (Dec. 31, 2018); Alexander L. Reid & Jason D. Dimopoulos, 
Top State Colleges, Universities Could Dodge Excise Tax on Coaching Salaries, MORGAN 
LEWIS (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/top-state-colleges-universities-
could-dodge-excise-tax-on-coaching-salaries [https://perma.cc/YXZ3-TWBV]. 
 246 IRS Answers Many Questions on New 21% Executive Compensation Tax, BKC (June 
10, 2019), https://www.bkc-cpa.com/irs-answers-many-questions-on-new-21-executive 
-compensation-tax/ [https://perma.cc/85PP-TJQF]. 
 247 Reid & Dimopoulos, supra note 245.  
 248 See id. (noting that Congress inadvertently created a “gap” which allows state 
colleges and universities not to pay the tax).  
 249 See Brian Faler, Congress Fumbles New Tax on Nick Saban’s Paycheck, POLITICO 
(Jan. 11. 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/11/congress-tax-college-pay-
1074839 [https://perma.cc/6LJN-ZZNY]; see also 26 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (exempting 
2020] BETTING ON EDUCATION 495 
may currently rely on this interim guidance and avoid the twenty-one percent 
tax on coaching salaries, the Treasury anticipates promulgating forthcoming 
proposed regulations that could ultimately close this loophole.250  
4. Excise Tax on Private Institutions’ Endowments 
The TCJA imposed a 1.4 percent excise tax on the investment income of 
certain private colleges and universities.251 This so-called “Harvard tax” could 
impact numerous private institutions that will be required to pay millions of 
dollars on previously untaxed funds.252 While not a direct tax on college athletic 
programs, the forfeiture of institutional revenue could impact future funding of 
more than 8000 student-athletes who compete in Division I athletics in Ivy 
League athletic programs.253 In conjunction with the $1.8 billion that the federal 
government is expected to derive from the twenty-one percent excise tax on 
compensation, this endowment tax is also estimated to produce $1.8 billion in 
federal revenue.254 
                                                                                                                     
from gross income “(1) income derived from any public utility or the exercise of any 
essential governmental function and accruing to a State or any political subdivision thereof, 
or the District of Columbia; or (2) income accruing to the government of any possession of 
the United States, or any political subdivision thereof”). 
 250 Lisa Christensen & Gabriel S. Marinaro, Interim IRS Guidance on New Executive 
Compensation Requirements for Tax-Exempt Entities Creates New Challenges, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/interim-irs-guidance-new-
executive-compensation-requirements-tax-exempt-entities [https://perma.cc/AE8F-WT 
DW]. 
 251 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 13701, 131 Stat. 2054, 2167 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 4968). The tax applies to private institutions that enrolled at least 500 students during the 
preceding tax year, have more than fifty percent of its tuition-paying students in the United 
States, and at least $500,000 in aggregate fair market value of assets per student. Id. 
§ 4968(b)(1)(A)–(D). 
 252 Kisska-Schulze, supra note 2, at 375 (discussing the “Harvard tax”); see also 
Matthew Sussis, Hit to Leading Universities from New Tax May Be in Tens of Millions of 
Dollars, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/hit-to-
leading-universities-from-new-tax-may-be-in-tens-of-millions-of-dollars-2018-01-16 
[https://perma.cc/WH4N-DHXB] (noting that at least twenty-seven Ivy league schools 
could be impacted by this tax). 
 253 Kisska-Schulze, supra note 2, at 375 (citing About the Ivy League, IVY LEAGUE, 
https://ivyleague.com/sports/2017/8/13/HISTORY_0813173057.aspx [https://perma.cc 
/DS9N-ZN47]). 
 254 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE 
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT”—FISCAL YEARS 2018−2027, JCX-
67-17 (2017). 
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5. Unrelated Business Income Tax 
As noted, public colleges and universities are generally considered tax-
exempt entities.255 However, any revenue derived from unrelated business 
income (UBI) is taxable at a rate of twenty-one percent.256 UBI is income earned 
by a tax-exempt organization from a trade or business that is not substantially 
related to the organization’s exempted purpose.257 Activities that may be 
considered UBI include “advertising and exclusive provider arrangements, 
sports management agreements, facility rentals, arenas, food service, golf 
courses, hotels, recreation centers and programs, parking lots, commercial 
research, and bookstores.”258  
In addition, effective January 1, 2018, tax-exempt organizations must now 
include amounts paid or incurred for qualified transportation fringe benefits, 
including any parking facilities used for parking or for on-premises athletic 
facilities.259 Further, the TCJA requires that UBI be calculated on a per-business 
basis instead of a per-entity basis.260 Essentially, the new law disallows tax-
exempt organizations from using net operating losses from one unrelated 
business activity to offset income earned from another of its unrelated business 
activities. One study determined that the new separate reporting requirement 
will annually diminish about $12,000 in funds from each affected nonprofit’s 
mission.261 
B. State Tax Frameworks for Sports Gambling 
State expenditures on higher education remain at a historic low.262 In 
addition, the TCJA will negatively impact funding to collegiate athletic 
programs. There is no doubt that Congress purposefully targeted higher 
education and college athletics in an effort to redirect revenue to the federal 
                                                                                                                     
 255 See 26 U.S.C. § 512 (2018); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 598: 
TAX ON UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (Mar. 2012) 
(documenting that UBI is taxed at regular corporate tax rates).  
 256 See 26 U.S.C. § 512; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 255, at 2 
(documenting that UBI is taxed at regular corporate tax rates).  
 257 26 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1). 
 258 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES COMPLIANCE PROJECT 
FINAL REPORT 11 (May 2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/CUCP_FinalRpt_05 
0213.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWQ6-7BC9]. 
 259 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13703, 131 Stat. 2054, 
2169 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 274). 
 260 See id. § 13702, 131 Stat. at 2168 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 512(a)). 
 261 Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT), INDEP. SECTOR, https://independentsector 
.org/policy/policy-issues/ubit/ [https://perma.cc/RE3U-5MFD] (last updated Apr. 17, 
2019). 
 262 MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 136, at 1. 
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deficit.263 However, with colleges and universities facing continued tuition 
increases, faculty cuts, and course reductions, state funding remains a critical 
component to help supplement—and perhaps now even substitute—lost internal 
revenue.264 Expanding funding models to address these financial pressures 
should be a strategic goal of state legislatures. Murphy could serve as the catalyst 
for generating new revenue back into colleges and universities. 
Post-Murphy, fourteen states and the District of Columbia permit sports 
betting and are collecting tax revenue,265 while more than thirty states have 
introduced some form of pending legislation.266 The tax rates imposed on sports 
gambling vary across jurisdictions, from a low of 6.75 percent to a high of fifty-
one percent.267 Similarly, the types of transactions upon which these levies are 
imposed differ across state lines. To better understand the national landscape 
surrounding the taxation of sports gambling, subsection (i) provides a chart 
identifying the current status of legislation, and subsection (ii) offers a more 
thorough discussion of the evolving measures taken by states to tax sports 
gambling in the United States. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 263 Peter Cary & Allan Holmes, The Trump Tax Law Has Its Own March Madness, CTR. 
PUB. INTEGRITY, https://publicintegrity.org/business/taxes/trumps-tax-cuts/the-trump-
tax-law-has-its-own-march-madness/ [https://perma.cc/PXT3-8F5R] (last updated Apr. 
7, 2019). 
 264 See MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 136, at 1 (identifying specific negative impacts of 
decreased funding following the Great Recession). 
 265 While both New York and New Mexico have very limited sports betting offerings 
currently, given that the offerings are not statewide, we have excluded them from the table. 
See Adam Candee, Without Mobile, NY Sports Betting Finally Launches Upstate at Rivers, 
LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/34442/ny-sports-betting-launch/ 
[https://perma.cc/8XXF-QWYJ] (last updated July 17, 2019); Holden, supra note 105. New 
York, by virtue of a 2013 law, allows in-person sports wagering at a small number of upstate 
casinos. See Candee, supra note 265. Whereas, by virtue of specific language in tribal 
compacts, a few New Mexico tribal casinos are able to offer sports wagering. See Holden, 
supra note 105.  
 266 Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every 
State Stands, ESPN, https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/the-united-states-
sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization [https://perma.cc/59P7-CNKZ] (last 
updated Dec. 30, 2019) (the states with some form of enacted legislation are Arkansas, 
Delaware, Iowa, Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia).  
 267 RICHARD C. AUXIER, TAX POLICY CTR., STATES LEARN TO BET ON SPORTS: THE 
PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS OF TAXING LEGAL SPORTS GAMBLING 5 (May 2019).  
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 268 This subsection provides a chart summarizing the current status of states’ sports 
gambling tax legislation as of March 1, 2020. As this is a quickly evolving area of law, 
readers should be aware that after March 1, 2020, information provided within this chart may 
have changed. 
 269 ARK. CONST. amend. 100, § 5. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Arkansas Issue 4, Casinos Authorized in Crittenden, Garland, Pope, and Jefferson 
Counties Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Arkansas_Issue_4,_ 
Casinos_Authorized_in_Crittenden,_Garland,_Pope,_and_Jefferson_Counties_Initiat
ive_(2018) [https://perma.cc/A4TN-ZZ68].  
 273 We used the Oxford Economics estimate for Arkansas and cut it in half, as the model 
Arkansas adopted does not make sports betting as widely available as the Oxford Economics 
estimates. See OXFORD ECON., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LEGALIZED SPORTS BETTING 36 (May 
2017); see also Evin Demirel, Don’t Bet on It: Impact in Arkansas of Legalized Sports 
Gambling Unclear, TALK BUS. & POL. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://talkbusiness.net/2018/08/ 
dont-bet-on-it-impact-in-arkansas-of-legalized-sports-gambling-unclear/ [https://perma 
.cc/S8NR-6927]. 
 274 H.B. 1327, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019).  
 275 Id. § 44-30-1508(1).  
 276 Colorado House Bill 1327, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/CO/bill/HB1327/2019 
[https://perma.cc/B5SZ-FTZE]. 
 277 We are extrapolating projected $10.4 million of tax revenue at a ten percent tax rate. 
See Kim MacCormack, Colorado Online Sports Betting, ROTOGRINDERS, https://roto 
grinders.com/sports-betting/colorado-online-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/QGF4-
UTNK]. 
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 278 H.B. 100, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009).  
 279 Id. § 22. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Delaware House Bill 100, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/DE/bill/HB100/2009 
[https://perma.cc/388W-CAWW]. 
 282 We extrapolated Delaware’s potential revenue based on its first seven months of 
operation. 
 283 H.B. 1015, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019).  
 284 Id. at ch. 5, § 12.  
 285 Id. at ch. 10, § 1.  
 286 Indiana House Bill 1015, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/IN/bill/HB1015/2019 
[https://perma.cc/F8SB-8YBN]. 
 287 We extrapolated Indiana’s potential revenue from the first three months of operation 
by multiplying the results by four. See USA Legal Sports Betting States, Sites & Revenue 
2020, ACTION RUSH, https://actionrush.com/sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/PVV3-
DBAU]. 
 288 S.B. 617, 88th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2019).  
 289 Id. § 8.  
 290 Id. § 15.  
 291 Iowa Senate Bill 617, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/IA/bill/SF617/2019 
[https://perma.cc/JR8U-8L2R]. 
 292 We extrapolated Iowa’s potential revenue from their first four months of operation 
by multiplying by three. See USA Legal Sports Betting States, Sites & Revenue 2020, supra 
note 287. 
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 293 Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.201 (1996); 
H.B. 4311, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019). 
 294 Mich. H.B. 4311, § 4(1). 
 295 Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act § 432.212(16). 
 296 Michigan House Bill 4311, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/MI/bill/HB4311/2019 
[https://perma.cc/QL7C-PVXZ]. 
 297 With Legalization Here, Michigan Poised for Sports Betting Boom, PR NEWSWIRE 
(Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/with-legalization-here-mich 
igan-poised-for-sports-betting-boom-300978445.html [https://perma.cc/B8ZF-6EQY]. 
 298 H.B. 967, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017).  
 299 Id. § 11(3). 
 300 MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 75-76-177(1)(a)–(c) (2013).  
 301 Mississippi House Bill 967, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/MS/bill/HB967/2017 
[https://perma.cc/N8R3-XBJK]. 
 302 We extrapolated Mississippi’s revenues out based on its March 2018 revenue of $8.4 
million, but recognize this may result in a slightly higher projection as a result of the NCAA 
basketball tournament typically being one of the most popular sports wagering events, which 
occurs during March. See Jeff Amy, Mississippi Casinos Win More as Sports Betting Boost 
Extends, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/1277d8e3c0484 
fd28a459aa8567c1508 [https://perma.cc/ZYU8-3NWT]. 
 303 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. § 463.370(1)(c). 
 306 We used Nevada’s 2018 revenue, as it was the only state offering sports wagering 
for the entire year. Brian Pempus, Nevada Smashes Sports Betting Revenue Record with $300 
Million Year, US BETS (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.usbets.com/nevada-2018-sports-
betting-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/U8TQ-H4LY]. 
 307 H.B. 480-FN, 165th Gen. Court, 2019 Sess. (N.H. 2019). 
 308 Id. § 287-I:3.  
 309 Id. 
 310 We extrapolated $15 million from New Hampshire projecting $7.5 million of 
revenue from fifty percent revenue sharing agreement. See Lisa Kashinsky, Chris Sununu 
Says N.H. Sports Betting Wagers Net $15.8 Million in One Month, BOS. HERALD (Jan. 28, 
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2020), https://www.bostonherald.com/2020/01/28/chris-sununu-says-n-h-sports-betting-
wagers-net-15-8-million-in-one-month/ [https://perma.cc/2RLX-B8RT]. 
 311 A.B. 4111, 218th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
 312 Id. § 7. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id.  
 315 Id. 
 316 We extrapolated New Jersey’s projected revenue based on its year-to-date revenue 
total as of the end of May 2019. See New Jersey Sports Betting Revenue, supra note 115. 
 317 Though not mentioned by name, Oregon is one of four states originally exempted 
under PASPA’s grandfather clause. See 28 U.S.C § 3704 (1992). Because of this, Oregon 
takes the stance that it is authorized to enact new sports gaming laws already within its state 
structure. See Dustin Gouker, Oregon Lottery Says It Has ‘Broad Authority to Introduce’ 
Sports Betting, Without New Law, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.legal 
sportsreport.com/19824/oregon-lottery-sports-betting-2018/ [https://perma.cc/L6VX-
NFRV]. 
 318 See Jabari Young, Oregon Lottery to Launch Sports Betting App Scoreboard with an 
Expected $300 Million in Wagers, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/oregon-
lottery-to-launch-sports-betting-app-scoreboard.html [https://perma.cc/GEF2-238Z] (last 
updated Oct. 15, 2019). 
 319 John Canzano, Canzano: Oregon Lottery Scoreboard Is Hamstrung with College 
Sports Wagering Ban, OREGONLIVE, https://www.oregonlive.com/sports/2020/02/canzano 
-oregon-lottery-scoreboard-is-hamstrung-with-college-sports-wagering-ban.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8D4U-8JYY] (last updated Feb. 26, 2020). 
 320 H.B. 271, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017).  
 321 Id. § 13C11(A)(1)(I). 
 322 Id. § 13C62(A). 
 323 Pennsylvania House Bill 271, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/PA/text/HB271/201 
[https://perma.cc/Z8D6-U5J5]. 
 324 To estimate Pennsylvania’s projected revenue, we used a 2017 Oxford Economics 
report based on convenient availability of the product, because as of the time of writing, 
Pennsylvania had not yet launched mobile wagering, though it was slated to during Summer 
2019. Though Oxford Economics used a lower tax rate than Pennsylvania actually 
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implemented, we have used the Oxford Economics projections for simplicity. See OXFORD 
ECON., supra note 273, at 39.  
 325 S. 0037A, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2019).  
 326 Id. § 42-61.2¬5(a). 
 327 Id. § 42-61.2–5(a)(1)–(3). 
 328 Rhode Island Senate Bill 37, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/RI/text/S0037/ 
id/1851946 [https://perma.cc/5R6P-RG64]. 
 329 Rhode Island’s sports betting revenue projection is based off of the Governor’s 
estimation of $11,500,000 in the state budget. See Patrick Anderson, R.I. Sports Betting 
Numbers Improved in March, but Remained Below Expectations, PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 22, 
2019), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20190422/ri-sports-betting-numbers-
improved-in-march-but-remained-below-expectations [https://perma.cc/5Z73-2BML]. 
 330 H.B. 1, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2019). 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. § 4-51-304(b). 
 333 Tennessee House Bill 1, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/TN/bill/HB0001/2019 
[https://perma.cc/W9W5-3BLF]. 
 334 We extrapolated Tennessee’s gross revenue from a $5.95 million projection on 20% 
tax revenue for 2021. See JACKSON BRAINERD, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, SHOW ME THE (SPORTS BETTING) MONEY (Aug. 2019), https://www.ncsl 
.org/Portals/1/Documents/Fiscal/Sports_Betting_SALT_Presentation_2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/UY84-87DW].  
 335 S.B. 415, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W.V. 2018).  
 336 Id. § 29-22D-15(a)¬(c). 
 337 Id. § 29-22D-16(a). 
 338 West Virginia Senate Bill 415, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/WV/bill/SB415/2018 
[https://perma.cc/DGH2-6Q9A]. 
 339 We extrapolated West Virginia revenue based on revenue earned through the week 
of June 29, 2019. See West Virginia Sports Betting Revenue, PLAYWV!, https://www.play 
wv.com/revenue/ [https://perma.cc/AS9T-SYYN]. 
2020] BETTING ON EDUCATION 503 
Washington, 
D.C.340 




































SB 1158 Introduced 01/23/2019; died 
in chamber355 
                                                                                                                     
 340 C.B. B22-0944, 22d Council (D.C. 2019).  
 341 Id. § 311(a)(1). 
 342 Id. § 315(a)(2). 
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Casino Launches Sports Betting Book, KRQE, https://www.krqe.com/news/new-mexico/ 
second-new-mexico-casino-launches-sports-betting-book/ [https://perma.cc/Z3JA-BL6Q] 
(last updated Mar. 15, 2019). 
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 414 See generally id. 
 415 H.B. 929, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2019).  
 416 Id. § 18E-603(b)(3). 
 417 North Carolina House Bill 929, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/NC/bill/H929/2019 
[https://perma.cc/8PJU-HQ4Z]. 
 418 H.B. 1254, 66th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019). 
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 420 Id. § 53-06. 1-12(1)(b). 
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 429 See generally id. 
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 431 Id.  
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2. Taxing State Gambling Revenue—An Overview 
Since the Murphy decision emerged, eight states have taken in almost $8 
billion in combined sports wagers.452 Legislators across the country have 
introduced more than 100 bills that could legalize sports betting in the majority 
of states.453 Implementing sound regulations and appropriate tax rates are of 
significant consideration.454 Tapping into this new revenue source could prove 
                                                                                                                     
 439 Id. § 1310(a)(3). 
 441 H.B. 1638, 2019 Leg., Sess. (Va. 2019).  
 442 Id. § 58.1-4036(A). 
 443 Virginia House Bill 1638, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/VA/bill/HB1638/2019 
[https://perma.cc/K44T-K5DB].  
 444 H.B. 1975, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2019).  
 445 Id. § 2(1). 
 446 See generally id. 
 447 H.B. 225, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2020).  
 448 Id. 
 449 Id. § 9-23-104.  
 450 Wyoming House Bill 225, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/WY/bill/HB0225/2020 
[https://perma.cc/SH73-2ZFJ]. 
 451 As of the date of this publication. 
 452 David Purdum, One Year into Legal U.S. Sports Betting: What Have We Learned?, 
ESPN (May 13, 2019), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/26740441/one-year-legal-us-
sports-betting-learned [https://perma.cc/SHK4-5BV2]. 
 453 See Geoff Mulvihill, State Lawmakers Place Their Bets on Sports Gambling, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/e257aa7d326d43259d66 
183253cd0563 [https://perma.cc/QRL2-YC8V]. 
 454 Holden, supra note 3, at 375 (discussing the taxation of sports gambling); see also 
Jennifer Roberts & Greg Gemignani, Who Wore It Better? Federal v. State Government 
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integral to states’ future budget plans; however, setting tax rates too high could 
spur illegal gambling and stifle revenues.455 To date, the rates imposed in those 
states that have legalized sports betting vary widely. 
Currently, there is no direct federal oversight of sports betting.456 States can 
set tax rates without an established cap.457 Such liberties have resulted in a great 
variance of rates. Nevada boasts the lowest tax rate at 6.75%, while Rhode 
Island imposes the highest rate of 51%.458 Both Rhode Island and Delaware 
implement revenue sharing programs that require the division of gaming 
revenue between the state and supporting operators.459  
New Jersey differentiates tax rates based on the type of wager made.460 
Land-based wagers are taxed at the lowest state gambling rate of 8.5%, while 
online casino bets are taxed at 13%, and online racetrack wagers at 14.25%.461 
Pennsylvania sports betting is subject to a 34% state tax on land-based wagers 
and a 2% local tax on sports betting revenue.462 In Mississippi, where only in-
person betting is permitted, the tax includes an 8% state and 4% local tax.463 
West Virginia imposes a 10% tax on both in-person and online wagers.464 In 
January 2019, the Washington, D.C. Council gave final approval to fast-track 
sports betting in the Nation’s Capital.465 The law, which went into effect on May 
3, 2019, imposes a 10% tax on revenue derived from gross sports wagering.466 
                                                                                                                     
Regulation of Sports Betting, 9 U. NEV. L.V. GAMING L.J. 77, 78–79 (2019) (noting that 
important issues to consider during legislative deliberations of legalized sports wagering 
include regulatory committees and tax rates). 
 455 AUXIER, supra note 267, at 6. 
 456 See Roberts & Gemignani, supra note 454, at 88. 
 457 See id. 
 458 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.3770(2) (LexisNexis 2019) (6.75% is the tax 
imposed on land-based wagering); see also S.B. 0037A, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 
2019).  
 459 See S.B. 0037A, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2019); H.B. 100, 145th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009); see also AUXIER, supra note 267, at 6. 
 460 See AUXIER, supra note 267, at 5–6 (discussing sports gaming taxation in the state). 
 461 A.B. 4111, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
 462 H.B. 271, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017); see also Jill R. Dorson, 
Pennsylvania’s Sports Betting Revenue Swoons in April, but Mobile Is Coming . . . Really 
Soon?, SPORTSHANDLE (May 16, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/pennsylvania-sports-
betting-revenue-april/ [https://perma.cc/C4KU-XEN9] (noting the breakdown of state and 
local tax implementation). 
 463 Mississippi Sports Betting Information—Sportsbooks, Betting Sites, SPORTSHANDLE, 
https://sportshandle.com/mississippi/ [https://perma.cc/6JLG-NF5V]. 
 464 S.B. 415, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018); see also Rodenberg, supra note 266. 
 465 C.B. B22-0944, 22d Council (D.C. 2019); see also Sports Wagering Lottery 
Amendment Act of 2018, D.C. Law 22.312 (2019). 
 466 D.C. C.B. B22-0944, § 315(a)(2); B22-0944—Sports Wagering Lottery Amendment 
Act of 2018, COUNCIL D.C., http://lims.dccouncil.us/Legislation/B22-0944 [https:// 
perma.cc/4PC9-JUAV]. 
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To measure these laws’ impact, it is appropriate to compare projected 
revenue to actual revenue collected.467 Nevada, although the longest running 
legalized sports betting jurisdiction in the nation, does not publish projected 
sports betting revenues.468 Delaware and New Jersey are the only two states 
meeting early revenue forecasts.469 Pennsylvania—projected to earn $100 
million in its first full year of implementation—generated only $2.5 million in 
its first quarter.470 West Virginia projected earnings of $5.5 million in its first 
year but collected just $862,000 by the third quarter.471 Mississippi is expected 
to capture approximately half of its $5 million projected income during its fiscal 
year.472 Rhode Island, boasting the highest tax rate, fell far short of its projected 
$23.5 million in revenue.473 With three months left in its fiscal year, the state 
earned just $925,000.474 
While actual revenues are lower than first-year projections for most states, 
the American Gaming Association (AGA) found that of the $7.9 billion wagered 
across the country since PASPA was overturned, $3 billion derived from new 
                                                                                                                     
 467 See William G. Gale & Aaron Krupkin, Did the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Pay for Itself 
in 2018?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/did-tax-
cuts-and-jobs-act-pay-itself-2018 [https://perma.cc/7Z84-NMUY] (opining that the most 
appropriate test for revenue impact (of the TCJA) is to compare actual revenues to predicted 
revenues).  
 468 AUXIER, supra note 267, at 2, 9. 
 469 See id. at 9 (publishing a $5 million revenue projection for Delaware and $12 to $17 
million projection for New Jersey in first full year of implementation); see also Jennifer 
McDermott & Geoff Mulvihill, Delaware an Outlier—Most States’ Sports Betting Revenue 
Misses Estimates, DEL. ONLINE (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.delawareonline.com/ 
story/money/business/2019/04/02/delaware-sports-betting-outlier-making-projected-
tax-revenue/3343764002/ [https://perma.cc/6UWS-62R8]. 
 470 Nathan Frederick, PA’s Sports Betting Tax Revenue May Be Low, but Budget Will 
Be Just Fine, PAONLINECASINO.COM (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.paonlinecasino.com/ 
4298/pa-sports-betting-revenue-projections/ [https://perma.cc/YK7Y-HLEB] (revenue 
from November 2018 through February 2019). 
 471 AUXIER, supra note 267, at 9 (listing the $5.5 million projection in year one of 
operations); see also Jennifer McDermott & Geoff Mulvihill, AP: Most States’ Sports 
Betting Revenue Misses Estimates, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 2, 2019), https://apnews.com/ 
21f9833e917948d6a36422bb286541b4 [https://perma.cc/FJR3-M2GV] (documenting 
West Virginia’s partial year tax revenue and noting that a contract dispute led to a shutdown 
of two sportsbooks and West Virginia’s only betting app at the onset of the NCAA March 
Madness tournament, one of the largest sports gambling events each year). 
 472 McDermott & Mulvihill, supra note 471. 
 473 AUXIER, supra note 267, at 9 (offering Rhode Island’s projected first-year revenue 
mark); see also Patrick Anderson, R.I. Sports Betting Numbers Improved in March, but 
Remained Below Expectations, PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.providence 
journal.com/news/20190422/ri-sports-betting-numbers-improved-in-march-but-remained 
-below-expectations [https://perma.cc/LSV2-DJCQ]. 
 474 Anderson, supra note 473. 
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markets.475 Among the states that have legalized sports betting, $55 million has 
been raised since May 2018.476 Although accounting for only 0.5% of the state’s 
entire budget, Nevada’s sports betting revenue set a record high of $44 million 
in 2018.477  
By the close of 2020, sports gambling is expected to be legal in thirty 
states.478 Projected gaming revenue from these states is high.479 In New York, 
a mature sports betting land-based and mobile market is expected to produce 
over $1 billion in annual revenue.480 In Indiana, the annual revenue projection 
is $12 million.481 The estimated annual sports betting revenue range in Arizona 
is in between $20 and $33 million,482 while Montana approximates generating 
$3.7 million in the first full year of operation.483  
Actual sports betting revenue, though variable, will have direct and indirect 
economic impacts.484 Employment opportunities will increase, labor income in 
the form of wages, salaries, and tips will grow, and the combined fiscal impact 
consisting of state, local, and federal taxes could total $8.4 billion.485 
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2018 revenue); see also Wayne Parry & Geoff Muvihill, Sports Betting Will Be No Home 
Run for State Budgets, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.pressofatlantic 
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 478 Thomas Barrabi, Legal Sports Betting: California Among States Set for 2020 Push, 
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online—collects from wagers after paying out successful bets but before it pays its expenses 
and taxes.” Id. at 3. 
 480 Eric Ramsey, Comprehensive Sports Betting Hearing Wraps Up in New York, LEGAL 
SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32249/ny-sports-betting-hearing-may-
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Establishing revenue-maximizing tax rates that the market can bear is key to 
securing the benefits of this new revenue stream.486 
Whether actual revenue meets, exceeds, or falls short of projections, there 
exists a strong historical connection between gambling and education.487 As 
previously noted, of the states with legalized sports betting in place, only 
Washington, D.C., Nevada, and Rhode Island direct some portion of earnings 
for educational purposes.488 The remaining jurisdictions direct sports gambling 
revenue to the general funds, without specifically earmarking any of such 
revenue for educational purposes.489 However, many of these states provide no 
restrictions on college sports betting. Specifically, there are no constraints for 
wagers made on college sporting events in Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Pennsylvania, or West Virginia.490 Delaware permits general betting on college 
sports, but disallows bets made on in-state teams.491 Rhode Island bans any form 
of college sports betting on in-state college teams, while New Jersey allows 
wagers made on multi-site college tournaments played outside the state.492 
Washington, D.C.’s legislation does not mention college sports betting at all.493  
If legalized wagering in any given jurisdiction includes college sporting 
events, perhaps colleges and universities are justified in receiving a piece of the 
pie. Well-crafted sports betting legislation may provide opportunities for 
increased funding to higher education at levels not seen in decades.494 The 
remainder of this Article proposes that the emerging sports betting arena is well-
situated to redirect a portion of state-earned gambling tax revenue to one of the 
biggest drivers of the market—higher education. 
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V. DIVIDING THE SPORTS BETTING PIE 
Perhaps one of the most ubiquitous aspects of legalizing sports betting at 
the state level has been the search for a piece of the sports betting pie.495 The 
economics of a sports betting transaction would suggest that there is a fair-sized 
pie for everyone to receive a reasonably sized slice.496 For instance, if a 
sportsbook sees a total amount of $500 million wagered in a month, and retains 
five percent,497 the sportsbook would hold $25 million in that month, out of 
which the company must pay their operating expenses and taxes, leaving a small 
margin of profit for the company.498 Sportsbook profitability is essential to 
creating a viable regulated market.499 In order to create room for sportsbooks to 
function, operating taxes, licensing fees, and other expenses must be kept 
reasonable.500  
One aspect that has drawn significant criticism has been a demand by certain 
professional sports leagues for a royalty of sorts, which they termed an “integrity 
fee.”501 The “integrity fee,” or “royalty,” is effectively a private tax created by 
the NBA and MLB to extract a portion of gambling operator revenue for 
themselves.502 Professional sports leagues lack a viable basis for claiming 
entitlement to gambling fees because they are private, profit-maximizing 
organizations that receive substantial public subsidies.503 In contrast, most 
collegiate sports programs run at a loss, relying heavily on allocated and 
generated revenue from the institutions within which they are housed and public 
charitable contributions.504 As such, finding an optimal approach that would 
allow colleges and universities—which internally fund the very sports now 
enticing legalized wagering across the United States—to recoup some of the 
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revenue generated is imperative. To examine these issues, this Part proceeds as 
follows: Section A discusses integrity fees, Section B examines integrity issues 
within college sports, and Section C proposes the implementation of a gambling 
interchange fee on wagers made on college sports. 
A. Integrity Fees 
The first appearance of the so-called integrity fee emerged when a bill was 
introduced in the Indiana legislature on January 9, 2018, roughly five months 
before the Supreme Court ruled PASPA unconstitutional.505 The bill required, 
“A sports wagering operator shall remit to a sports governing body . . . an 
integrity fee of one percent (1%) of the amount wagered on the sports governing 
body’s sporting events . . . at least once per calendar quarter.”506 The one 
percent fee transitions into an amount closer to twenty percent of a sportsbook’s 
profit when accounting for a five percent hold.507 A twenty percent reduction in 
profit would make Indiana’s market virtually untenable for a sportsbook 
operator.508 Indiana Representative Alan Morrison, who introduced the bill, 
obliged sports league representatives who requested inclusion of the integrity 
fee language.509 
Within the month, NBA Executive Vice President Dan Spillane testified in 
a New York hearing that sports leagues should be compensated by the one 
percent fee because they are experiencing increased risk associated with 
legalized wagering.510 On February 12, 2018, MLB joined the NBA in seeking 
an integrity fee, making the request via lobbyists in a variety of states 
considering legalizing sports pre-Murphy.511 Interest in integrity fees from the 
sports leagues has continued, though the NBA and MLB later rebranded the 
phrase as a “royalty,” suggesting that the leagues were entitled to a fee on an 
intellectual property theory based on the idea that the leagues put on sporting 
events, which are the subject being wagered upon.512 
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The quest for integrity fees by professional sports leagues continued through 
the end of 2018, with the amount sought having been reduced to 0.25%; 
however, the decreased fee appeared no more palatable as no state has thus far 
passed a bill granting a fee.513 While a number of states introduced legislation 
with integrity fees, no state has awarded any sports league a fee.514 Instead, a 
number of leagues have shifted their requests to a mandate that sportsbooks use 
official data, provided by sports league contractors. Such requests have received 
a generally cool reception from lawmakers, except in Illinois and Tennessee 
where bills passed requiring that sportsbooks use league-approved data for 
certain types of wagers.515 The NBA and MLB have primarily driven the search 
for compensation from legal sports betting operators, but most professional 
leagues have spoken on the issue.516 The NCAA, however, an organization of 
amateur athletes, has remained relatively silent and steadfast in its opposition to 
legalized gambling with or without an integrity fee.517 
B. Integrity of Collegiate Sports? 
While the term integrity fee may have been a marketing ploy created by the 
NBA, colleges may be most vulnerable to gambling-related threats as student-
athletes are unpaid and thus potentially more susceptible to bribery.518 Several 
institutions have inquired via lobbyists about the possibility of receiving an 
integrity fee associated with sports betting; but the NCAA has remained 
opposed to any expansion of sports betting whether legal or illegal.519 Despite 
the opposition, NCAA President, Mark Emmert, stated: “Sports wagering is 
going to have a dramatic impact on everything we do in college sports. It’s going 
to threaten the integrity of college sports in many ways unless we are willing to 
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act boldly and strongly.”520 While the NCAA has opposed the expansion, it has 
endorsed the federal regulatory model as a lesser of two evils.521 
The NCAA is unique in regards to other sports leagues, who have been 
vying for a share of sports betting revenue.522 The NCAA is a member 
organization composed of public and private educational institutions that 
generally offer athletics on a nonprofit basis, as opposed to the profit-
maximization model of the professional sports leagues.523 The NCAA has long 
sought to educate athletes about the risks of associating with gamblers.524 The 
availability of widespread legal sports wagering may however create new 
temptations for college athletes, but a legalized and regulated market controlling 
who can place wagers offers protections not available in illegal markets.525 As 
a result, it has been suggested that the NCAA embrace the expansion of legal 
sports betting and seek viable shields to protect athletes.526 
Indeed, the NCAA has begun building safeguards, including formalizing 
relationships to monitor the integrity of NCAA events.527 In addition, individual 
colleges and universities are communicating with legislators about sports 
wagering, with Marshall University and West Virginia University purportedly 
requesting integrity fee-type payments alongside professional sports leagues in 
West Virginia.528 Other schools have taken a different approach.529 Penn State 
University and the University of Pittsburgh, as well as the University of 
Arkansas, have sought restrictions on wagering on in-state schools, a practice 
that is antithetical to protecting integrity.530 Forcing bettors to wager on local 
teams outside of the state is likely to drive those persons to illegal sportsbooks, 
which do not comply with state regulatory requirements and may be less likely 
to report irregularities, thus creating a threat to those in-state teams.531 Most 
colleges and universities, however, have been largely quiet in seeking 
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compensation from legal sports betting.532 They may well be best positioned of 
all the sports leagues to do so; by virtue of being predominately state-funded 
institutions, it may be appropriate that a percentage of wagering revenue be 
earmarked to these schools in a way that is distinct from the allocation of a tax 
benefiting private organizations.533 
C. Gambling Interchange Fees 
As discussed, the unyielding needs of colleges and universities to source 
funds is a growing problem.534 Legal, regulated sports wagering could provide 
higher education an opportunity to recoup some of the funding cuts resulting 
from the Great Recession and the TCJA. Sports wagering provides a unique 
opportunity for states to legislate a funding mechanism geared towards 
universities without implementing new taxes or diverting funds from other 
beneficiaries.  
A gambling interchange fee (GIF), earmarked to benefit state colleges and 
universities, would provide institutions with additional revenue to account for 
expenses tied to monitoring sports-related integrity concerns and supplement 
budgets that have long been the victims of state funding cuts.535 A GIF is a 
transaction fee charged on every wager made to a sportsbook on a national 
college sporting event.536 In particular, the GIF would be comprised of (1) a set 
percentage fee attached to all wagers made on college sporting events with a 
state-registered sportsbook, and (2) an increased fee attached to wagers that may 
pose a greater risk to the integrity of college athletics. Increased integrity risks 
include certain types of in-play events that could lend themselves to 
manipulation (such as a missed penalty kick in a soccer game), without 
necessarily having a significant impact on the overall outcome of the game.537  
For example, suppose the State of Mississippi imposes a two percent GIF 
on all wagers made at registered Mississippi sportsbooks on NCAA sporting 
events. In addition, assume Mississippi imposes a 10-cent flat fee on wagers 
made on certain in-play events, including college football field goal attempts. X 
places a $100 bet at a Mississippi casino on Ole Miss winning the upcoming 
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football rivalry game against Mississippi State University (MSU), and a $50 
wager on MSU’s kicker missing four attempted field goals during that game. 
The total GIF charged on $150 of X’s wagers is $3.10.538  
Data shows that in the first three months of 2019, 64% of all bets placed in 
Mississippi were tied to college sports.539 If Mississippi’s total gambling 
revenue during that period was $25,200,000, $16,128,000 of that total was 
linked directly to college sports betting. With a 2% GIF attached to wagers made 
on collegiate athletic events, Mississippi could have remitted $322,560 to state 
colleges and universities in a manner legislatively determined within the state. 
That base amount could have increased based on the number and types of 
wagers made on in-play events posing greater risks to college sports integrity. 
Although a GIF will not likely replace the total amount of losses suffered 
by institutions, it may supplement some of the financial harms suffered by 
institutions as a result of the TCJA.540 The following chart depicts projected 
revenues derived from college sports betting in those states that have legalized 
sports-betting, accompanied by projected revenues from GIF based on the 
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State  Projected 
Revenue541 








New Jersey $199,176,986.40 $99,588,493.20 $1,991,769.86 
Nevada $301,048,000.00 $150,524,000.00 $3,010,480.00 
Pennsylvania $808,400,000.00 $404,200,000.00 $8,084,000.00 
Mississippi $100,800,000.00 $50,400,000.00 $1,008,000.00 
West Virginia $23,864,696.60 $11,932,348.00 $238,646.96 
Delaware $15,997,230.86 $7,998,615.43 $159,972.30 
Rhode Island $11,500,000.00 $5,750,000.00 $115,000.00 
Arkansas $31,700,000.00 $15,850,000.00 $317,000.00 
Indiana $122,763,300.00 $61,381,650.00 $1,227,633.00 
Iowa $49,128,081.00 $24,564,040.50 $491,280.81 
Michigan $500,000,000.00 $250,000,000.00 $5,000,000.00 
Colorado $104,000,000.00 $52,000,000.00 $1,040,000.00 
New 
Hampshire 
$15,000,000.00 $7,500,000.00 $150,000.00 
Tennessee $29,750,000.00 $14,875,000.00 $297,500.00 
Oregon -$5,300,000 $0 $0 
Total $23,131,282.93 
  
Implementing a 2% GIF on college sports betting revenue (as opposed to 
“handle”)543 on half of all legalized projected gambling revenue nets over $23 
million to be distributed back for use in higher education. Although outside the 
scope of this Article, the success of the GIF ultimately rests on states 
individually adopting reasonable regulations that accompany the prescribed fee. 
Equitable regulations must include moderate yet competitive tax rates that 
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minimize revenue siphoning across state borders and disincentive wagers made 
in the untaxed illegal market, as well as statutory language designating GIF 
revenue for use by public colleges and universities.544  
The GIF is not a panacea, but instead, a measure to alleviate losses that 
higher education institutions have experienced over the past several decades, 
and even more recently via the TCJA. Introducing a GIF may invite opponents, 
particularly as bookmakers seek to maximize profits while lobbying for the 
lowest possible total tax rate, and private, professional sports leagues similarly 
seek their own piece of the pie. However, neither of those interests meet the 
substantial purpose that public colleges and universities fulfill.545 Gambling has 
long been tethered to education in the United States. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Murphy could serve as the catalyst for reinvigorating funding to 
higher education, and their affiliated college athletic departments. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Both the TCJA and Murphy v. NCAA stand to impend the viability of U.S. 
institutions and college athletic departments.546 The 2018 federal tax overhaul 
included a direct hit on collegiate funding, resulting in the continued 
diminishment of public educational financing.547 In addition, college athletic 
directors identified Murphy as posing a significant threat to the integrity of 
collegiate sports.548 While more than thirty states have introduced bills 
legalizing sports betting within their jurisdictions, only two have earmarked any 
of their newfound gambling tax revenue for higher education.549  
States’ de minimis interest in using a portion of sports gambling revenue to 
secure the economic future of public colleges and universities is surprising for 
two reasons. First, public institutions and their affiliated athletic departments 
directly finance—through allocated and generated resources—the very sports 
that are helping drive the legalized sports betting market.550 Second, there exists 
a lengthy historical connection between gambling and education in the United 
States.551 Based on these premises, we suggest that higher education be entitled 
to a piece of the revenue pie.  
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This Article proposes that college administrators embrace sports wagering 
as a means of increasing the integrity of college sports,552 and advocates that 
public institutions are well-positioned to capitalize on a portion of states’ 
gambling tax revenue.553 This Article introduces the implementation of a 
gambling interchange fee attached to wagers made on college sporting events to 
redirect funding back into higher education.554 Unlike integrity fees, which the 
professional sports leagues are currently lobbying for, a gambling interchange 
fee would fit well within the historic blueprint of lottery and gambling revenue 
being reinvested into U.S. public education. A gambling interchange fee 
attached to college sports wagering would financially benefit state institutions 
and generate new revenue to account for expenses associated with sports-related 
integrity concerns. Post-Murphy the time is ripe for states to give back to the 
institutions and athletic departments helping to influence the newly legalized 
U.S. gambling market. 
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